Howls of derision will doubtlessly follow this assertion. A finger will be pointed to Western European deliveries up by seven per cent, Eastern European up by 175 per cent, CIS by 1200 per cent and the rest by 98 per cent. Figures such as €1.19 / $1.54 billion / £783 million net income on sales of €13 / $16.87 / £8.56 billion will be mentioned, as will as will a return on sales of eight per cent. In 2006, MAN’s CV sales rose by 17 per cent to 79,822 units. Terrific. Splendid. Etc. We would observe, however, that making money out of the European truck business in 2006 was like finding money in the street. 2006 was a seller’s market like no other.

Cue another kicking from Munich for saying this, but, even with just shy of 80,000 unit sales last year, MAN is still a bit-part player. Put these numbers up against leviathans such as DaimlerChrysler (537,000 unit sales in 2006), Volvo (219,931) and Paccar (166,800), and MAN has to be seen as tiny by comparison. It falls behind Tata, Hino, possibly Iveco, in terms of trucks rolling out of the door, and it is utterly dependent upon Western Europe – which, last year, accounted for over 71 per cent of its truck business.

But – and this is the real problem with annual results – what does MAN do next? 2006 has been and gone; MAN outpaced the Western European market by three per cent, and this was with the huge advantage of a non-SCR derived Euro 4 engine. The obvious comparison here is that which can be made with Scania, which saw better Western European market penetration during 2006. But this is all now history.

MAN seems to understand the logic of scale. And it is still pursuing a merger of sorts with Scania. The instinct for maintaining this laughable aim is, we feel, analogous to that instinct that causes dogs to pursue cars of which they have little or no intention of ever driving; it's fun to watch, initially rather diverting, but ultimately pointless.

And such a dogged pursuit of Scania hardly squares with the company’s stated aim of seeing 110,000 CV sales by 2010. MAN-Scania merely serves to consolidate the core businesses of two OEMs both highly exposed to one sector – heavy trucks – in one cyclical, saturated market – Western Europe. It is hard to see where a bump of 30,000 vehicles in a falling market is going to emerge. Surely MAN – and its shareholders – would be better pursuing new markets both in terms of geography and product. Of course, MAN has a 20,000 unit joint venture in India about to come on stream, but even so, it remains a parochial player.

The key issue here is one of strategy. MAN seems to believe that it can grow in a semi-organic fashion, whilst maintaining parity with those OEMs that have chosen to adopt mergers as the means to growth. Ten, twenty years ago, this was a choice. Today, it isn’t.

As the likes of Volvo, DaimlerChrysler and Paccar – all of which it must be said have their own issues with which to deal – continue to grow exponentially - in part through acquisition - then the likes of MAN – and Scania, Iveco et al – seemingly stuck in a regional mindset – can only shrink in real terms. Ultimately, there comes a point at which the gulf between big and small becomes too great, especially when we are talking about a product that is increasingly viewed as a commodity – a Commercial Vehicle. Everyone’s minds seem focused on 2006 here; this is wrong – they should be focused on 2026, and the likely structure of the industry two decades from now. MAN’s approach – whilst historically successful – seems to have no place in the future.

In sum, MAN is - at present - standing pretty. In time however, we suspect that it will look down, observe that it is standing in something unpleasantly organic and fast reach the conclusion that it is wearing innapropriate footwear. At the point at which the wiping and blaspheming begins, then so too can a reasoned analysis of MAN's future viability.